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This article examines how possibilities for Muslim expression are shaped by the 
political imaginaries in Soviet era and independent Uzbekistan. It develops the 
concept of social imaginary in Charles Taylor’s critique of western secular 
modernity. Political imaginaries are the assumptions about the nature of being, 
the essential categories through which the world is understood and acted upon, 
that are produced within dominant state discourses and that shape the space for 
the political. The article compares the Soviet vision of socialist modernity and the 
logic of the current state ideology in independent Uzbekistan, and discusses how 
these have framed the possibilities for being Muslim. It argues that the category 
of culture is produced in distinct and contrasting ways in these imaginaries, and 
plays a central role in delineating the public space for Islam.  
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What is the public space for being Muslim in Uzbekistan? A number of scholars have 
pointed to the effects of the securitization of Islam by Central Asian governments in the 
context of an international “war on terror” (Omelicheva 2011). They have explored the 
efforts of these governments to authorise their own approved forms of religious 
expression, and to repress those they characterise as “extremist” and dangerous to social 
and political stability, a situation that is particularly acute in Uzbekistan. Adeeb Khalid 
has argued that the government of Uzbekistan exaggerates the threat of these groups in 
order to control Islamic practice, and has in effect created a category of “independent 
Muslims” who practice Islam independently of the state (Khalid 2007: 168-91). Russell 
Zanca has pointed out that these efforts can alienate Muslim populations and perhaps 
increase opposition to established regimes (Zanca 2005; see also Trisko 2005). This 
article seeks to contribute to this discussion by exploring the logic of official state 
discourse in Uzbekistan, placing Soviet and post-independence discourses in 
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comparative perspective. It develops the concept of political imaginary to capture how 
this logic extends beyond the official texts of state ideology. Political imaginary refers 
to the logic and foundational categories that underlie these textual productions which, in 
turn, constitute the logic of the interventions of state officials in the lives of citizens, and 
in terms of which citizens must present themselves in public space. The concept of 
political imaginary helps us to understand why a Muslim convert to a Christian 
denomination might be arrested for possessing the Bible in contemporary Uzbekistan 
despite the fact that possessing the Bible is not illegal, or why that convert might even 
be accused of being a Wahhabi.  
 Within the Soviet Union religious expression was closely regulated, a situation 
that has continued after Uzbekistan became an independent state in 1991. Both regimes, 
in their different ways, have sought to regulate social space and to define correct 
“citizen subjects”. The New Soviet Person was ideally to be an enlightened, rational 
subject who had internalised an ethic of socialist modernity that left no space for 
religious belief. This has given way to the komil inson, the “perfect” or “complete” 
person, constructed in Uzbekistan’s “Idea of National Independence” as the 
embodiment of a cultural and spiritual Uzbek authenticity. This post-independence state 
ideology posits a return to an authentic Central Asian cultural and spiritual heritage, 
purported to have been suppressed during Soviet rule, that encompasses a specifically 
Central Asian Islam (Rasanayagam 2011: 103-10). In practical terms, the new ideology 
is intended to naturalise the territory of Uzbekistan as an ethnonational state and to 
legitimate the authoritarian rule of the present regime led by president Karimov. 
 The significance of these ideologies is not that they are successful in actually 
transforming human subjects and shaping consciousness. As the historian of the Soviet 
Union Stephen Kotkin has put it, people learned to speak Bolshevik in public, while 
simultaneously inhabiting a counter -society of circumventions and localised 
resistances. They learned to “work the system to their minimum disadvantage” (Kotkin 
1995: 237). Hegemony can be productively understood as defining the character and 
logic of public performance rather than as shaping an interior state of belief (Scott 1985; 
Yurchak 2006). State ideology in Soviet and independent Uzbekistan is significant 
because it is productive of what might be called the “political”. It makes action and 
events in certain contexts or circumstances public, and determines how individuals must 
present themselves and their actions in this public space. 
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This article examines the distinctive political imaginaries of Soviet and post-
independence state discourses, and how the latter emerges out of, but is also radically a 
departure from, the Soviet experience. It explores the conceptions of culture produced 
within these imaginaries, and how they shape the possibilities for the public 
performance of Muslim practice. I am adapting the concept of imaginary from the 
philosopher Charles Taylor’s writing on western secular modernity. Taylor develops an 
analysis of a plurality of conceptual worlds. He seeks to displace western secular 
modernity from its position as the teleological endpoint of a universal human 
evolutionary progress, and locates it as just one possible modern among others (Taylor 
2004). Taylor employs “social imaginary” to refer to: 
the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, 
how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations (Taylor 2004: 23). 
Taylor employs social imaginary to encompass a diffuse contemporary western 
“culture”. The anthropologist Morgan Liu has taken inspiration from Taylor’s writing to 
develop a concept of socio-political imaginary in the context of Kyrgyzstan. For Liu, 
this is intended to capture the “grasp people have of the conventional actors, groups, 
actions, places, contexts, times, meanings, and interests involved in their collective 
life”, the “explicit ideologies about society but also embodied social practice” (Liu 
2012:14). Unlike Taylor and Liu, I am not employing imaginary to refer to diffuse 
culture or an embodied habitus that informs everyday experience. I am restricting my 
analysis to state ideological production. But ideology extends beyond the specific texts 
and pronouncements of state officials. In this article I show how the hegemony of 
official state discourse is materialised in its performance.1 Taylor’s analysis is useful for 
grasping this performative and dynamic quality because it draws attention beyond the 
surface text to the logics, the categories for thought and action, that constitute the 
conceptual worlds of state ideologies. These logics or imaginaries shape the way that 
state officials intervene in the lives of citizens, and how citizens are forced to present 
themselves in public space, in ways that go beyond the texts themselves. 
 The anthropologist Bruce Kapferer has used the notion of ontology in a similar 
way in relation to nationalist discourses. Cosmic ontology, for Kapferer, refers to the 
fundamental principles of being in the world. He contrasts Sri Lankan Buddhist and 
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secular Australian nationalisms. The former constructs a hierarchal order where the state 
protects and guarantees the integrity of both the nation and (Buddhist) person in the face 
of threatening, fragmentary elements, namely Tamil separatist movements. Australian 
nationalism presents a vision of egalitarian individualism where the state itself can 
become the threat to the integrity of the (autonomous) person if it assumes a dominant 
and inclusive relation to the nation. Kapferer is interested in how state level nationalist 
discourse articulates with ordinary practices of everyday life and engages the emotions. 
He argues that the ontology of nationalist discourse is also present in everyday worlds, 
that nationalism becomes linked with identical logics of being that orient everyday 
experience. What nationalism seeks to do is to co-opt and discipline the heterodox and 
dynamic everyday experience and practice within an orthodoxy so as to frame 
experience and perception (Kapferer 1988).  
I am not employing the idea of imaginary to capture the logics of everyday 
lifeworlds. However both Taylor’s concept of imaginary and Kapferer’s focus on 
ontological logics direct attention to the normative categories through which the nation 
and the citizen are produced within state discourse, and the sources of authenticity that 
lie at the heart of state projects. These shape the space for the political in Uzbekistan. 
How do Soviet and post-Soviet state projects construct the nation and the relation 
between state and citizen? What concept of personhood, history and progress do they 
produce? How are categories such as public and private, modernity and tradition 
defined? Key to understanding the essential divergences between the Soviet and post-
Soviet political imaginaries in Uzbekistan, and how they create different public spaces 
for being Muslim, is the category of culture.  
 
A question of culture 
The category of culture produced within state political imaginaries creates possibilities 
for religious expression, and this is particularly evident in cases of conversion to 
Christianity by members of “traditionally” Muslim populations. The experience of one 
such convert I encountered in Samarkand during field research in 2004 is illustrative.2 
Ahmadjon is a Tajik speaker of “Arab” nationality.3 He encountered Christianity some 
years before our meeting through his mother’s illness and their search for a cure, a 
feature of several conversion narratives I heard in Samarkand. Conventional biomedical 
treatment proved ineffective, and the family had recourse to a number of healing 
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strategies. They called on mullahs to read passages of the Qur’an over his mother, 
visited the shrines of avliyo, or “saints”, and turned to folbin, healers who invoked the 
aid of spirits. Eventually, a Christian pastor told Ahmadjon about Jesus and they visited 
the prayer meetings of this unregistered Protestant group, which took place in a private 
house. His mother recovered her health through attending these meetings, and 
Ahmadjon’s household, which includes his parents, his three married brothers and their 
families, have all become Christians. Ahmadjon became an active member of this 
Christian group, assisting the pastor, who is Russian, with translations into Tajik and 
Uzbek. Ahmadjon recounted his own internal conflict and the ongoing opposition of 
neighbours in his mahalla, which is called Arabkhona and is populated predominantly 
by people of Arab nationality like himself. He considered himself a real Muslim unlike 
the Tajiks (who make up the majority of Samarkand’s urban population) because, as an 
Arab, he has the Prophet’s blood in his veins, and how can a Muslim believe in Jesus? 
Many of his neighbours were putting pressure on the family to revert back to being 
Muslim. After he became a Christian, they accused him of selling out his religion, and 
even of being a “Wahhabi”. Rather than theologically based notions of apostasy, in 
large part these objections stemmed from the idea that it is unnatural for a member of 
one of the indigenous Central Asian populations to be anything other than Muslim. 
Similarly, it would be unnatural for a European Russian to be anything other than 
Orthodox Christian.  
 The identification of religion with ethno-national identity in Central Asia has 
been traced to the colonial incorporation of the region within the Tsarist Empire. Shirin 
Akiner has argued that it emerged in the contact and opposition between the indigenous 
population that was predominantly Muslim, and non-Muslim settlers and administrators, 
mainly Christian Slavic (Akiner 1997). This identification as it is manifested in the 
contemporary period is also in large part a product of Soviet nationalities policy that 
was founded on a primordialist vision of ethno-national belonging, defined in terms of 
language, culture and territory, and an evolutionary theory of development through 
defined historical stages (Hirsch 2005; Slezkine 2000). A number of historians of 
Central Asia have argued that this policy has produced a “secular” or “cultural” Islam. 
Notably, Nazif Shahrani has argued that the political culture of “scientific atheism” 
inculcated through the system of education, in combination with the restrictions on 
religious practice that cut off the vast majority of Soviet Muslims from access to 
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knowledge of the sacred texts and from developments in Muslim thought throughout 
most of the 20th century, enhanced by the politics of “fear and favour”, succeeded to a 
significant degree in colonising the consciousness of Central Asians (Shahrani 1995). 
Along similar lines, Adeeb Khalid argues that under Soviet rule religious knowledge 
shrank drastically and Islam survived as an aspect of a localised national tradition. It 
became little to do with personal belief or ritual observance, but served to mark 
indigenous Central Asians from the Slavic and other European populations settled in the 
region. Soviet anti-religion policies destroyed the means through which Islamic 
knowledge was produced and transmitted, and prevented the daily ritual practice that 
was centred on mosques and conducted in public space. At the same time, the Soviet 
state support for national forms allowed Islam to survive as an element within what 
came to be regarded as Central Asian national custom, such as wedding celebrations, 
music, and national costume (Khalid 2003; 2007).4 
 The fusion of religion with ethno-national identity gives a particular quality to 
the dilemmas faced by Central Asians who become Christian believers. It forces them to 
confront the unnaturalness of a Central Asian Christian by separating out the categories 
of culture and belief. As described by a number of indigenous Central Asian members 
of Protestant Christian groups I encountered in Samarkand, this process is not so much a 
“conversion” from one belief system to another, but a primary entry into a state of 
belief. They described their former selves, along with the majority of self-ascribed 
Muslims in Uzbekistan, as “cultural Muslims” who rarely, if ever, fulfilled Islamic 
ritual prescriptions. Ahmadjon’s reply to accusations that he sold out his religion is that 
he had no real belief in the first place that he could have betrayed. A feature of many 
conversion narratives is a separating out of an internal state of belief (in Jesus) from an 
external cultural practice (as Muslim).5 
 The accusation levelled at Ahmadjon of being a Wahhabist hints at a further 
dimension to the “unnaturalness” of a Central Asian Christian, one which is more 
particular to Uzbekistan and the political imaginary produced by the post-independence 
state. This accusation, levelled at a convert to Christianity, might at first seem puzzling 
given that Wahhabism is a specifically Islamic movement. The mullah of the local 
mosque had threatened to report Ahmadjon’s father to the internal security services, and 
a school in Arabkhona had been visited by the security services, who had taken down 
the names of all children who had become Christian. The direction of the accusation of 
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Wahhabism at Christian converts receives its logic from Uzbekistan’s post-
independence political imaginary. The present government has identified political 
Islamism as a major threat to its own authority, and religious expression, particularly 
Islamic, is liable to be suppressed ruthlessly if it is perceived as independent of state 
authorised definitions of culturally authentic Central Asian Islam (Rasanayagam 2006; 
Khalid 2007). In the context of the present regime’s emphasis on cultural authenticity, 
the label of Wahhabi extends beyond Islam to any “unnatural” practice which might 
seem to be religious in some way. The political imaginary of independent Uzbekistan 
inherits from the Soviet regime an association between culture and religion but, as I will 
explore more fully in the following section, publicly embodying a cultural authenticity, 
within the logic of the post-independence political imaginary, has become a critical 
dynamic of the political, in order to establish oneself as a “correct” Uzbek subject and 
citizen. Cultural authenticity has become a matter of national security. 
 
Imaginaries of secular modernity 
A recurring topic of controversy in Uzbekistan is the appropriate conduct of life cycle 
events; marriages, circumcisions and funeral commemorations. They have generally had 
to be curtailed in scale because of the economic hardship that much of the population 
has experienced since the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the consequent 
disintegration of means of livelihood and withdrawal of social provision by the state. 
Even so they continue to be relatively lavish affairs that can impose an onerous burden 
on household budgets. A marriage can involve multiple feasts. In the event of a death, 
relatives and neighbours typically pay their respects in the days immediately afterwards, 
on the Thursdays of the weeks following, and special commemorations are organised on 
the third, twentieth and fortieth days, as well as a year after the funeral. These occasions 
represent a significant financial expense as visitors need to be given a meal, and a 
mullah or a qori (Qur’an reciter) needs to be hired to recite the Qur’an and say prayers. 
In the case of funerals, these expenses cannot be planned for, which increases the 
material burden they represent.  
Imams appointed by the state controlled Muslim Board of Uzbekistan to manage 
officially registered mosques, as well as many other Muslims who have gained 
knowledge of the sacred texts and their interpretation (often in one of the madrasas 
which have opened since independence under the control of the Muslim Board) 
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condemn extended feasts as contrary to the sharī‘a. They point to the exemplary 
practice of the Prophet who was mourned for only three days by his closest followers 
and criticise anything in excess of this as illegitimate innovation, the product of a 
misguided human tradition. For imams, the material hardship caused by these events is 
further proof of their illegitimacy as there is nothing in Islam properly understood, they 
argue, which would cause harm to Muslims.  
As Sergei Abashin (1999) has observed, their criticisms are seemingly in line 
with current government policy that calls for moderation in expenditure. During the 
Soviet period, too, religious rituals were a target for attack by state and Communist 
Party activists, but in each of these cases criticism is framed within different 
rationalities. Soviet criticism, sometimes reflected in the accounts of Soviet 
ethnographers, emerges from the logic of the project of socialist modernity intended to 
transform “traditional” Central Asian society and fashion new Soviet persons.6 In this 
vision, the extravagant expenditure on ritual was irrational waste, a non-productive use 
of resources. It was part of pre-modern tradition, religion and superstition which needed 
to be discarded to allow the emergence of rational, scientific thinking and the 
development of a truly socialist society and citizenry. 
The criticisms of the post-independence government are framed very differently. 
Here, tradition is not presented as an obstacle to rationality and progress. Rather, 
cultural authenticity and the “Golden Heritage” of the nation is constructed as the 
authentic source for the Idea of National Independence developed to replace Marxist 
Leninism as the legitimating ideology of nationhood. On a practical level, the 
government is no doubt worried that the excessive expenditure on lifecycle events 
highlights growing inequalities and levels of poverty since independence, but it couches 
its criticism not in terms of scientific rationality, but presents such behaviour as contrary 
to historically rooted national spiritual values (Abashin 1999).  
The criticism of imams invokes yet another frame. They criticise extended 
feasting as bid’at, illegitimate innovation outside the bounds of the sharī‘a and 
therefore something Muslims should not engage in. While presenting their position as 
fully in support of government policy, the understanding of tradition invoked is very 
different. Through a study of the sacred texts, albeit within madrasas controlled by the 
Muslim Board, imams view Islam as God’s Truth that transcends geographical and 
cultural borders, even if some allowances might be made for local norms and customs. 
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The post-independence government locates its discourse of nationhood in the “Golden 
Heritage” but tradition and custom, urf-odat, is for the imams a fallible, contingent, 
human creation in opposition to the divine Truth materialised in the physical universe 
and articulated as God’s Speech, the Qur’an. 
A discussion of Charles Taylor’s concept of social imaginary brings out the 
distinctive rationalities of these different positions, and the critical importance of the 
category of culture. What is central to western modernity, Taylor argues, is a new 
conception of a moral order for society which identifies human agency as the creative 
source of social formations. While in a pre-modern order social systems of hierarchy 
and differentiation might express or correspond to the given order of the cosmos, within 
the modern order it is human beings who create society in secular time, in the course of 
the historical succession of events as opposed to an unchanging or eternal higher time. 
Human beings come to be imagined within a state of nature in which humans stand 
outside relations of hierarchy and status, as rational individuals who join together within 
society for mutual benefit. Ideals of justice and equality are understood as natural rights, 
as human goods rather than as originating in any supernatural location. Modern society 
is therefore horizontal and egalitarian, as opposed to the vertical, hierarchical ordering 
of society on the basis of essential differences in classes of persons, such as nobles and 
serfs, or hereditary castes (Taylor 2004). The perception of this state of nature is 
imagined as clouded or suppressed by traditional beliefs and false superstitions, and 
historical progress towards the modern era of empirically founded, scientific truth is 
conceived as the liberation of the individual from artificial constraints of pre-modern 
thinking (Taylor 2007). 
I find Taylor’s analysis productive for understanding the Soviet and post-Soviet 
condition because it directs us to the sources of authenticity that inform the rationalities 
of different imaginaries. Within Taylor’s western secular modern, authenticity is located 
in the inherent value of the human subject, and in human creativity enacted in historical 
time, what he refers to as the “immanent frame”. In both the western and Soviet 
versions of modernity, the natural freedom of the autonomous, rational individual is 
imagined as being suppressed or clouded within pre-modern orders and their associated 
traditional modes of thought or false consciousness. By contrast, in the ideological 
discourses of the independent state of Uzbekistan, tradition is not constructed as an 
impediment to enlightenment, but rather an authentic cultural heritage is posited as the 
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foundation for a distinctive Central Asian modernity of economic, political and spiritual 
development. The Golden Heritage is the source of an Uzbek authenticity. 
The Soviet project, particularly in its early decades up to the end of the Stalinist 
period, involved a concerted attempt to transform the human subject. David Hoffmann 
has described this essentially as a process of enculturation (Hoffmann 2003). In Soviet 
ideological discourse, the concept of kul’turnost’, or “culturedness”, implied not only 
high culture but civilised behaviour. The civilising mission was aimed at fashioning 
subjects who internalised new behavioural norms and values, and rational dispositions 
of efficiency, hygiene, sobriety and literacy. Kul’turnost’ might be understood as the 
embodiment of a socialist rationality. In opposition to the competitive, egoistic 
individualism of bourgeois capitalist societies, the New Soviet Person was to enter 
society as part of a collective, achieving his or her human potential in the pursuit of 
collective, rather than individual, goals. Enculturation was to be achieved not just 
through ideological pronouncements from the centre, but was worked out through the 
capillaries of society, in the work place, leisure activities, and living spaces, and through 
practices of peer and self criticism (Kharkhordin 1999; Kotkin 1995).  
A good examination of how this worked in practice is provided by Medlin, Cave 
and Carpenter, in their study of education in Soviet era Uzbekistan in the early 1960s. 
They described the development of “moral education” in the Soviet school, designed to 
instil the communist consciousness. Moral training was integrated into a range of 
subjects such as literature, history and geography, which was included in a block called 
“Political Education”. A Soviet morality was also instilled in the organisation of pupils 
in classroom collectives to aid their learning in how to monitor their own conduct and 
that of their peers, and to develop a consciousness of working as part of a larger 
collective extending to the school as a whole, and beyond. Student collectives formed 
work groups for sharing physical tasks around the school such as maintenance of the 
buildings and gardening. Group leaders were appointed, a post that was rotated among 
members of the collective. The goal of moral education, as these authors report it, was 
to instil a scientific outlook, an appreciation for labour, socialist patriotism and to 
achieve the all-round harmonious development of the individual in physical, intellectual 
and aesthetic qualities (Medlin, Cave, and Carpenter 1971). Hoffmann identifies similar 
language in a 1920 Commissariat of Health report entitled “The Tasks of Physical 
Culture”. This report stressed that physical exercise should promote health, but also 
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“create the harmonious individual and complete individual from whom one can expect 
qualities of most benefit for the common good” (Hoffmann 2003: 35-6). The idea of 
“moral education” and the language of the “complete” and “harmonious” person finds 
its echo in the komil inson, the “perfect person” of Uzbekistan’s Idea of National 
Independence, but as we shall see, within a very different conceptualisation of culture. 
In contrast to the positively valued Soviet kul’turnost’ were perezhitki, or 
“survivals”, the backward cultural forms, institutions and traditions from the past that 
hindered the progress of socialist transformation. Francine Hirsch captures the Soviet 
category of survivals in her book Empire of Nations in which she discusses early Soviet 
nationalities policy. The chapter on ethnographic exhibits in Soviet museums describes 
how they were designed to display the different peoples of the USSR as experiencing a 
period of rapid economic and cultural uplift. The conceptual frame employed was the 
evolutionary path of ethnonational development through defined historical stages, and 
the exhibits showed how the peoples of the Soviet Union were being accelerated along 
the path towards a scientifically founded socialist modernity. They also depicted the 
outmoded cultural forms and traditional beliefs, the survivals that continued to hold up 
progress. At worst, these were the “class enemies” such as feudal landowners, clan 
leaders, or shamans, and in Central Asia, Muslim figures such as ishans and mullahs 
(Hirsch 2005). It is in this opposition between a progressive and enlightened Soviet 
kul’turnost’, which both reflected and produced a socialist society, and harmful, 
regressive, pre-modern cultural survivals, that we need to understand the Soviet concept 
of national culture. The national forms of music, dress, dance, food and so on, were 
folkloric, neutral containers that stood outside these two politically loaded categories of 
culture. They were to be filled by a socialist content or, as Mathjis Pelkmans has 
described in the case of Kygyzstan, could be co-opted by Protestant missionaries after 
socialism for a Christian orientation of personal belief (Pelkmans 2007).  
With independence in 1991, the ruling elites in Uzbekistan were faced with the 
task of developing a narrative of nationhood. The essential themes of this vision are 
summarised in a government publication entitled “The Idea of National Independence” 
(Milliy istiqlol g’oyasi, hereafter referred to as MIG). Post-independence ideology owes 
much to the Soviet legacy. The very existence of Uzbekistan as a territorially defined 
nation state, founded on principles of ethnicity, language and national culture is a 
fundamental inheritance of Soviet nationalities policy, but the influence of Soviet 
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ideological practice extends far beyond this. The need for a national ideology is itself 
founded on the Soviet view that individual consciousness is a reflection of a material 
order of society. An important theme in post-independence state discursive production 
is the need to fill the “ideological vacuum” left by the collapse of the Soviet project, and 
to provide “ideological immunisation” especially for younger generations (Karimov 
1997: 34; MIG 7, 39-42).7 Soviet influence is evident in much of the key terminology 
and language of the post-independence ideological discourse. The final section of “The 
Idea of National Independence” outlines how the new ideology is to be disseminated 
throughout society. It contains subheadings on “Upbringing and Education”, “Art and 
Literature”, “Physical Culture and Sport”, “Work Collectives”, and “The Media”, which 
would not have been out of place in a similar Soviet document. The section on sport, for 
example, talks about physical culture as an important element in moral and spiritual 
perfection. The document contains a section entitled “The Perfect Person” (komil inson) 
that begins with the statement, “The complete person is one who strives continually to 
embody, in both national and universal human terms, a moral and physical perfection” 
(MIG: 56), which clearly echoes the harmonious and complete person of Soviet 
discourse.  
Other subheadings in the final section of this document, “Religion” and “The 
Mahalla”, indicate how the post-independence ideology is also an essential departure 
from the Soviet project, and the difference turns on its vision of culture. Laura Adams 
has produced a convincing and thorough analysis of the post-independence Uzbekistan 
as an elite project of nation building through culture, and how this project both drew 
upon Soviet concepts of culture and nationality, while also developing along its own 
distinctive path (Adams 2010). At the heart of the new ideology is the idea of an Uzbek 
authenticity. This is rooted in the oltin meros (Golden Heritage), the historically 
developed complex of distinctly Uzbek spiritual values and national personality traits, 
embodied in the great philosophers, scientists, writers and Islamic thinkers who lived in 
the territory of present day Uzbekistan. It finds expression in the notion of ma’naviyat, 
which might be translated as spirituality or morality. As developed in state ideological 
production this is the embodiment in the individual of the authentic cultural and 
spiritual heritage (Kendzior 2014). A nationwide network of centres for “Spirituality 
and Enlightenment” (ma’naviyat va ma’rifat), have been established to promote the 
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government’s ideas about national spiritual development, and the prolific ideological 
writings authored by the president are required reading in schools and universities.  
Post-independence ideology is founded on an essentialist conception of culture, 
as a “spirit of a people” that shapes their values and mentalities (MIG 9-21). It inherits 
this concept from the Soviet understanding of ethnonational development, but where the 
Soviet project sought to reduce national culture to a folkloric form, and to fill this form 
with a socialist consciousness, post-independence ideology is founded on the idea of an 
Uzbek cultural and spiritual authenticity. The new national vision looks forward to 
economic and scientific development, but Uzbekistan needs to take its own, culturally 
and spiritually authentic path and have its own system of government. This might of 
course be seen as window dressing for authoritarian rule, central control of the 
economy, and an excuse for the lack of any real popular representative democracy and 
personal freedoms. But the essentialist notion of culture as Uzbek authenticity 
nevertheless shapes the nature of the political in distinctive ways. 
The Soviet ideological project viewed the human subject as pliable material that 
could be transformed through the shaping of consciousness. This consciousness both 
reflected, and also produced, a socialist ordering of society. Cultural survivals were 
placed in opposition to a socialist kul’turnost’. This opposition within the Soviet 
political imaginary, that also produced categories of class enemies and allies, provided 
the logic through which state organs and personnel could intervene in society. This 
logic shaped the terms in which Soviet citizens needed to reproduce themselves, in 
public space, as “correct” Soviet persons. In post-Soviet Uzbekistan the opposition is 
between an authentic “Uzbekness” and foreign, dangerous ideas that are alien to the 
essential cultural and spiritual being of Uzbek society. Legitimate membership of 
society is framed in terms of an authentic, embodied culture, as a natural and essential 
quality of the person (Kendzior 2014). Ideology, here, is intended to develop and 
reinforce a morality that is viewed as natural to the Uzbek person. Those who in some 
way are seen as inauthentic, are placed outside the body politic as unnatural, perverse or 
misguided, hence the need for ideological “immunisation”.8 While in neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan converting to Christianity might be seen as a cultural or ethnic transgression 
with social consequences in a local community, in the political imaginary of 
independent Uzbekistan, cultural inauthenticity is a national betrayal, a public affair of 
state, and national security is embodied in the Uzbek person. Islamic practice is 
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acceptable if it is perceived to be rooted in Central Asian traditional practice, but 
anything which can be characterised as odd, unusual or foreign is vulnerable to being 
characterised as dangerous extremism and “Wahhabism”. 
 
The space for Islam 
Since independence, the space for Islam has been vastly expanded, in the sense that the 
post-independence government has allowed Islam a much larger public presence. 
Thousands of mosques have been built, the tombs of Central Asians prominent in 
Islamic history, such as Imom al-Bukhoriy and Bahouddin Naqshband, have been 
lavishly renovated as national monuments at state expense, and madrasas have been 
established throughout the country to provide Islamic education. But the government 
continues to regulate religious expression closely, and represses interpretations of Islam 
that stand outside its discursive construction of cultural authenticity. In comparison to 
most Muslim societies, including neighbouring countries like Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, open debate over what constitutes correct Islam and what it means to be 
Muslim are severely muted. The government regulates Islamic practice and orthodoxy 
through the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, which manages the madrasas and mosques, 
appoints the imams to registered mosques (the only ones in which the main Friday 
prayers and sermon can be held), and drafts the themes for the Friday sermon.  
Official imams are expected to promote officially sanctioned expressions of 
Islam and to monitor the population for signs of “extremism”. However, the 
construction of Islam within state discourse, as subordinated within a locally authentic 
cultural and spiritual heritage, contradicts their own understandings in fundamental 
ways. Imams are not simply government functionaries. All those I encountered during 
my field research were engaged in a sincere study of the Islamic textual tradition, and 
committed to transmitting correct knowledge of Islam and what it means to be a 
Muslim, as they understood this to be. Much of what state discourse extols as an 
authentic Central Asian spiritual heritage is considered by madrasa trained imams as the 
product of fallible human tradition (urf-odat), survivals of pre-Islamic ritual. Practices 
they criticise, in addition to the extended feasting associated with life cycle rituals 
already referred to, include visiting the tombs of avliyo, or “saints”, or seeking the 
services of practitioners who heal or prophesy with the help of spirits (Rasanayagam 
2011: 138-143; Kehl-Bodrogi 2006). At the same time, however, the Muslim Board and 
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its imams are required actively to support and enforce government policy. Imams are 
forced to be circumspect, and their freedom to condemn what they consider to be un-
Islamic innovation is constrained. 
 The way that the quasi-state Islamic religious establishment negotiates this 
tension is evident in its criticism of excessive expenditure at ritual events, such as 
weddings and funerals, which were alluded to in the previous section. Guidance on the 
conduct of household ritual events is included in a manual produced for the leaders of 
mahalla committees by the National Mahalla Foundation and the Ministry of Justice.9 
The manual consists of a collection of laws, articles of the constitution, presidential 
speeches and decrees, and decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers, which relate to the 
activities of the mahalla.10 Two sections deal specifically with the conduct of ritual 
events, both of which are framed in terms of reducing overly extravagant display and 
expense. The first of these is a document produced by the National Mahalla Foundation 
and the National Women’s and Girls’ Commission entitled “Advice on the conduct of 
national traditional customs, feasts, funeral rites and other national ceremonies in light 
of the present need for streamlining and economising”.11 It is presented in tabular form, 
providing a list of ritual events, advice on how to conduct them in terms of how many 
and which categories of people to invite, the significance and meaning of each occasion, 
and advice on how to reduce expenditure.  
In the section on weddings thirteen separate events are listed, beginning with the 
fotiha yuborish at which the fotiha, the first sura of the Qur’an, is recited by senior 
family members and the date of the wedding set, proceeding through the civil 
registration and the main wedding feasts (at which 400-600 guests are stipulated), and 
ending with the kelin ko’rish after the bride has settled into her new household (usually 
the husband’s family’s), at which the bride’s natal family present gifts to the couple and 
to the groom’s family. Other rituals covered include those concerning birth and 
circumcision, and the section on death lists ten rituals. These include the three day 
mourning period, gatherings three or seven days after the funeral for close relatives, a 
twentieth day commemoration feast (at which 300-400 participants are suggested), a 
fortieth day commemoration and an event to mark the first falling of snow after the 
death. In describing the significance of ritual events Islamic norms are sometimes 
referred to. For example, when describing the aqiqa ceremony for the birth of a child 
the document states that within Islam one third of the sheep sacrificed for the occasion 
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is kept and two thirds have to be distributed as ehson, charitable giving. Other events, 
such as all the death commemorations except the initial three days of mourning, are 
described as ceremonies not stipulated within the sharī‘a. 
In fact, this list does not cover all the ritual events that households host. For 
example, it does not mention the mavlud, commemoration of the birth of the Prophet, 
which has become popular in recent years. Moreover, most households would not hold 
the full series of rituals concerning marriage and death, and in my own field research 
sites aqiqa ceremonies were relatively rare. The document is intended as advice for 
mahalla leaderships with the aim of reducing what the government considers to be 
wasteful and extravagant expenditure on ritual occasions. At the same time, the effect of 
the document is to reify and authorise the idea of a body of traditional ritual, some of 
which may have some reference to Islam but which is primarily national in essence, part 
of the government’s discursive construction of “Uzbekness”. 
 The second document concerning the conduct of rituals in the manual is a fatwa 
issued by the Mufti, the head of the Muslim Board. It instructs the imams of registered 
mosques to warn their congregations through their Friday sermons of the evils of 
extravagance and vanity in the conduct of ritual feasts and funeral commemorations. 
The fatwa is clearly intended as a support for the government’s policy and makes an 
effort to fit in with state discourses. It declares that rituals should be conducted in 
accordance with both religious (diniy) and national (milliy) norms, and that extravagant 
spending at weddings is contrary to “our eastern civilisation”, echoing the government’s 
discourse on the unique Central Asian cultural and spiritual heritage. At the same time, 
it singles out the series of commemorative rituals surrounding death for special mention, 
held on the seventh, twentieth and fortieth day, and one year after the funeral, which it 
describes as connected with “custom” (odat). It goes further than the previously 
mentioned document in that it instructs imams to point out that these not only are not 
stipulated in the sharī‘a, but might actually be bid’at, illegitimate innovation that is 
unacceptable for Muslims.12 Although the wording seems chosen so as to avoid 
contradicting government discourse too directly, it cannot avoid suggesting an 
alternative frame for understanding custom and tradition, not as a celebrated foundation 
for an authentic Uzbek model of progress and development but as a contingent human 
artefact in opposition to the divine Truth of the sharī‘a. 
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 The state established ulama of the Soviet era Muslim Spiritual Directorate for 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) occupied a similarly ambiguous position. In his 
comprehensive history of Islam in the Soviet Union, Yaacov Ro’i documents how the 
Spiritual Directorates (there were four, each administrating a separate region of the 
USSR) issued fatwas in support of Soviet state objectives. These included fatwas on the 
conduct and observance of Islamic festivals in order to avoid absenteeism and damage 
to the economy. Other fatwas sought to limit the expenses on the iftor feasts breaking 
the fast during Ramadan. Many were in support of Soviet policy towards women, 
proclaiming their right to education or stressing that veiling was not obligatory, and 
some, in common with the post-independence fatwa referred to here, criticised wasteful 
spending on weddings and circumcisions as sinful (Ro’i 2000: 140-155). The Soviet-era 
ulama had to accommodate themselves to the imaginary of the Soviet project. 
 The state established ulama of the Soviet era Spiritual Directorates and the post-
independence Muslim Board operate within the logic of the political imaginaries of 
those respective state regimes, but they are not mere mouthpieces for central 
government. Mark Saroyan has described the Soviet ulama as both fundamentalist and 
accommodationalist; fundamentalist because of their dedication to promoting a 
scripturally founded interpretation of Islam, purifying local practice from unscriptural 
innovation. He argues that they also sought to rework the Soviet discourse of the New 
Soviet Person, to show that Muslims could be active participants in Soviet society 
(Saroyan 1997). While establishment ulama, both Soviet and post-Soviet, support state 
policies, they also inhabit their own, Islamic conception of truth and authenticity, as the 
fatwa reproduced in the manual for mahalla leaderships shows. Their relation to the 
hegemony of state ideology cannot be captured in straightforward terms of domination 
and resistance. 
The imams in charge of mosques registered with the Muslim Board whom I 
encountered did not express any opposition to state ideology, and supported government 
policies and pronouncements in their sermons, for example condemning religious 
extremism and groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. But they also preached what they 
understood as correct Islamic practice (Rasanayagam 2011: 138-43). Many of the 
imams I encountered in Samarkand were from families who had been imams or Islamic 
scholars in the pre-Soviet era, and had maintained a level of Islamic learning through 
the Soviet period. Before graduating from the state controlled madrasas in independent 
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Uzbekistan, they had received Islamic education from their fathers or grandfathers. The 
father of one had been an official imam of one of the few Soviet era mosques allowed to 
operate in the city, and another claimed descent from the 15th century Naqshbandi 
scholar Sayyid Ahmad Kosoniy, known as Makhdum-i A’zam. They occupied a 
Muslim imaginary which is starkly in opposition to that of Uzbekistan’s Ideology of 
National Independence, an opposition which is brought into sharp focus in the attitude 
to national culture, but they did not actively resist it. 
 The Soviet space for Islam was one which excluded the public performance of 
Islamic ritual. It was one of discrete shrine visitation, or rituals invoking spiritual 
intercession such as the bibiseshanba. For some, it was the private performance of 
prayer in the home, or visiting mosques by older generations. It was the space of 
lifecycle rituals which invoked a Muslim frame, such as circumcisions, weddings, and 
funerals, which located and reproduced a person within a moral community. This is 
what Maria Louw has called “everyday Islam”, and in large part what Central Asian 
Muslims encompass with the term musulmonchilik, or Muslimness (Louw 2007; 
Privratsky 2001). This is not to say that such practice was merely cultural, if by the term 
culture we mean to draw a distinction between being Muslim as an ethnonational 
marker of identity, as opposed to Islam as stance of belief, devotion and piety, founded 
on a relation to the core sacred texts of Islam; secular culture as opposed to spiritual 
belief. This opposition occludes the possibility that much of what might be perceived as 
“traditional”, non-scripturally founded practice of Muslims, is in fact a moral 
engagement with the transcendent, and contributes to the development of moral and 
Muslim selves. Maria Louw has described the “ironic” stance of residents of Biskhek in 
Kyrgyzstan who with some embarrassment, recount visits to clairvoyants and healers. 
On one level, they view this as pre-modern, superstitious, and un-Islamic practice. At 
the same time, these visits, and their encounters with signs of God in dreams, and when 
performing prayers, are transcendent sites for the contemplation of moral self and 
society (Louw 2012). Refracted through the Soviet imaginary, all this was understood 
as either pre-modern “survivals” or expressions of a folkloric “national culture”.  
 In the imaginary of the post-independence state, the space for Islam has shifted. 
Cultural authenticity is the criterion through which the government intervenes in society 
to distinguish between those who belong and dangerous, foreign elements, whom the 
cry of “Wahhabi” has come to represent. These are the terms in which a person needs to 
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reproduce him or herself as a proper citizen. This makes sense of why the particular 
charge of Wahhabism was levelled at Ahmadjon and others in Arabkhona Mahalla who 
had converted to Christianity by their neighbours. With this charge, the affair is placed 
in the public sphere and the state security services come to be employed within 
neighbourhood disputes. What these individuals are really speaking to is the 
inauthenticity of a Christian Central Asian, within the terms of the new state imaginary. 
They know that Wahhabism is a specifically Islamic tendency, and that a Christian 
cannot be a Wahhabi, but they also know that being “inauthentic” can make a person 
vulnerable, a public threat to national security. 
 
Word count: 7420 excluding notes and references. 
 
Notes 
1 For ethnographically grounded accounts of how politics, including ideology, is performed in Central 
Asia see (Reeves, Rasanayagam, and Beyer 2014). 
2 The ethnographic research on which this article is based was carried out between July 2003 and August 
2004 in the city of Samarkand and in a village near the city of Andijan. 
3 Uzbekistan retains the Soviet administrative practice of registering citizens both in terms of ethno-
national belonging (natsional’nost’ in Russian, millat in Uzbek), and state citizenship (grazhdanstvo or 
fuqarolik). 
4 Shirin Akiner also argues that Islam was reduced to what she calls an ‘ethnocultural’ rather than a 
religious allegiance (Akiner 1996), and Yaacov Ro’i writes about the ‘secularisation’ of Islam in the 
USSR (Ro’i 1995). 
5 Mathijs Pelkmans has described how this dynamic works out in missionary activity in neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan (Pelkmans 2007). 
6 See for example Poliakov (1992). Deniz Kandiyoti and Nadira Azimova have critiqued the use of the 
frame of tradition and modernity in Soviet ethnographic accounts of Islam in Central Asia (Kandiyoti and 
Azimova 2004). 





8 Nick Megoran has written about President Karimov’s use of the trope of an authentic Uzbekness in his 
response to the events in Andijan in May 2005, when hundreds of protests were gunned down by the 
security forces (Megoran 2008). 
9 The mahalla is a residential subdistrict which also acts as a social institution. While in the pre-Soviet 
and Soviet eras various forms of community institutions existed in rural settlements and in the old 
quarters of cities, the post-independence government has formalised these as mahalla with a locally 
elected leadership committee. It has extended the network of mahalla to cover all residential districts, 
even those made up of highrise apartments, although in areas in which it has been relatively recently 
imposed the mahalla has little social relevance (Rasanayagam 2011: 49-58). 
10 Mahalla: fuqarolar o’zini ‘yzi bosqarishining huquqiy asoslari. 2003. Tashkent: O’zbekiston ‘Mahalla’ 
khayriya jamg’armasi. 
11 Respublicada mavjud an’anaviy udumlar, to’ylar, dafn ma’rakalari va boshka milliy marosimlar va 
ularni zamon talablariga javob beradigan tarzda, ihcham hamda tejamkorlik bilan u’tkazishga 
qaratilgan tavsiyalar 
12 Marhumlar dafnidan keyin odat tucsiga aylangan 7, 20, 40, yil, hayit kunlaridagi fotihaxonlik kabi 
marosimlarning shar’iy emasligi, balki bid’at ishlardan ekanligi tushuntirib borilsin. 
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